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PROPERTY-

COMMISSION -THRESHOLD
BROKERAGE
STANDARD FOR IMPOSING SELLER LIABLITY FOR A BROKERAGE
COMMISSION IN A FAILED TRANSACTION Is A DETERMINATION
THAT THE SELLER BREACHED THE SALES CONTRACT-Van Win-

kle &Liggettv. G.B.R. Fabrics, Inc.,

103 N.J. 335, 511 A.2d 124

(1986).
The truth is that real estate brokerage is a highly competitive, intensely
jealous collage of profit-worshippingzealots .... 1

Although this unflattering characterization of the brokerage industry may be applicable to any profession, it lends support to the
fact that legal publications and courts are rife with actions regarding
real estate brokers' commissions. 2 In fact, when compared with
other occupational related litigation, broker commission cases command a quantum of American court time.3 The bulk of litigation
arises from disagreements between the broker and the seller as to
when the broker is entitled to a commission. 4 Typically such disputes occur when, subsequent to a broker's procuring a buyer for
the seller's property, the seller is unable to complete the

I

M.

2

1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS

28 (1984).
§ 50 (1955); L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN
AMERICA 46-50 (1965); Note, Let the Seller Beware-Unconscionabilityand the Real Estate
Broker's Employment Contract, 5 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 59 (1974) [hereinafter Note, Seller
Beware]; Note, Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson: A Reexamination of the Broker-Buyer-Seller
Relationship in New Jersey, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 83 (1968) [hereinafter Note, A Reexamination]; Comment, Colorado Real Estate Broker Listing Contracts, 35 U. COLO. L. REV.
205 (1963) [hereinafter Comment, Colorado Real Estate]; Note, Duties, Rights, and
Remedies of Real Estate Brokers, 8 U. FLA. L. REV. 513 (1955) [hereinafter Note, Duties,
Rights and Remedies].
3 L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 46. This phenomenon is easily understood in
view of the American affinity for the investment appeal of real estate. See generally
M. STEVENS, supra note 1. Franklin D. Roosevelt may have provided the best rationale for investing in real estate: "Real estate cannot be lost or stolen, nor can it be
carried away. Managed with reasonable care, it is about the safest investment in the
world." Id. at 90.
Among the leading causes for the disparity in the amount of litigation in broker commission cases is the rise in the number of land transactions, and the notion
among buyers and sellers of realty that the commission charged is disproportionate
to the services performed by the broker. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1986, at 498 (1986); A. CORBIN, supra note 2. See
also L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 47; R. LiFrON, PRACTICAL REAL ESTATE: LEGAL,
TAX AND BUSINESS STRATEGIES 88-89 (1979) ("[O]nce a desired service is rendered,
many people, like the town fathers of Hamlin, dislike paying a very large fee for
what appears to be very little work.").
4 A. CASNER & W. LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 699 (3d ed. 1984);
Note, A Reexamination, supra note 2, at 83. See Comment, Colorado Real Estate, supra
note 2, at 205; Note, Duties, Rights and Remedies, supra note 2, at 513.
STEVENS, LAND RUSH
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5

In most jurisdictions, the rule is that absent an express agreement, a broker earns his commission when he produces a buyer who
is ready, willing, and able to purchase the property on the seller's
terms.6 In Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson,7 the Supreme Court of
New Jersey rejected the majority rule and declared that, as a matter
of law, in the absence of seller default, the broker's commission was
contingent upon the buyer's performance of the contract.8 Thus, in
the absence of a closing and fault, a broker was not entitled to his
commission. 9 Since Ellsworth Dobbs revolved around the issue of
buyer default, the court failed to address the concept of seller default.'° Recently, the court articulated a standard for imposing liability upon the seller in Van Winkle & Liggett v. G.B.R. Fabrics, Inc. "
A textile manufacturer, G.B.R. Fabrics, Inc. (GBR), owned a vacant lot in Rutherford, New Jersey. 2 In February 1979, a broker
from Van Winkle & Liggett proposed that GBR list their property
for sale. 3 One week later, GBR mortgaged the lot as part of a collateral package in order to obtain a $946,000 flood disaster loan
from the Small Business Association (SBA). 14 In September 1979,
GBR placed the property on the market by signing an open listing
agreement with Van Winkle.' 5
5 See D. BURKE, LAW OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS
10 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW

§ 3.2, at 102 (1982).

OF CONTRACTS § 1287 (3d ed.
1967); Note, Seller Beware, supra note 2, at 59-60. See D. BURKE, supra note 5, at
§§ 3.2-3.5 (reviewing the majority rule in detail). A broker has been characterized
as
an agent employed by a seller or buyer to negotiate the sale, purchase,
or exchange of real estate on a commission contingent on success ....
His primary function is to act as an intermediary between the buyer and
the seller, and to aid in the negotiations leading up to the sale,
purchase, or exchange of real estate.
H. LUSK & W. FRENCH, LAW OF THE REAL ESTATE BUSINESS 274 (1975).
7 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843 (1967). See infra notes 100-23 (discussing Ellsworth
Dobbs).
8 Ellsworth Dobbs, 50 N.J. at 555, 236 A.2d at 857. The Ellsworth Dobbs court
maintained that "[t]he present New Jersey rule . . . is deficient as an instrument of
justice." Id. at 547, 236 A.2d at 853.
9 See D. BURKE, supra note 5, at § 3.6.
10 See Ellsworth Dobbs, 50 N.J. at 555, 236 A.2d at 857; Note, A Reexamination, supra
note 2, at 87.
11 103 N.J. 335, 511 A.2d 124 (1986).
12 Id. at 337, 511 A.2d at 125.
'3 Van Winkle & Liggett v. G.B.R. Fabrics, No. L-68453-78, at 4 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. Sept. 16, 1983) (transcript of oral decision), aff'd, No. A-768-83T3, A1239-83T3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 19, 1984), rev'd 103 N.J. 335, 511 A.2d
124 (1986).
6

14 Id.
15 Petition

for Certification and Appendix of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner at
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In May 1980, Latorraca Realty Corporation informed Van Winkle that a potential buyer, Columns Enterprises (Columns), was interested in purchasing the property. 16 Subsequent to negotiations,
Van Winkle delivered a contract proposal to GBR.' 7 Van Winkle
was then informed of the SBA lien.' 8 At GBR's request, GBR and
Columns renegotiated for an all-cash transaction.' 9 Van Winkle
confirmed the offer and acceptance subject to the terms of the contracts drawn by both parties' attorneys.2"
Columns' and GBR's attorneys revised the contract with the
proviso that its terms were "expressly conditioned" upon the release of the mortgage by SBA. 2 In the interim, GBR contacted the
SBA to effectuate the release of the mortgage and submitted a proposal for a collateral substitution.2 2 GBR's proposal suggested that
the proceeds of the sale be applied toward the purchase of tax free
municipal bonds.2" All trading activities and liquidations in the
portfolio would be subject to SBA approval.2 4 The SBA, however,
rejected GBR's proposal as inconsistent with the original purpose of
2, Van Winkle & Liggett v. G.B.R. Fabrics, Inc., N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 19,
1984 (No. A-768-83T3); Van Winkle, 103 N.J. at 337, 511 A.2d at 126. In an open
listing agreement, the seller employs a broker to produce a buyer ready, willing and
able to buy on the seller's terms. See R. LIFrON, supra note 3, at 94. In return, the
seller promises to pay the broker the stipulated commission for his services. Id.
The seller may also opt for: (a) an exclusive agency agreement by promising that
for the duration of the contract period he will not sell the property to a buyer procured by another broker; or (b) an exclusive right of sale agreement (also known as
an exclusive sale listing) by giving the broker the exclusive right to sell the property, thus entitling him to a commission, regardless of who arranges the sale during
the listing period. Id. at 94-96.
The GBR agreement provided for the payment of 6% commission based on
the sale price, when title passed, if Van Winkle was "instrumental in effecting a sale
or lease" of the property. Van Winkle, 103 N.J. at 337, 511 A.2d at 126.
16 Van Winkle, 103 N.J. at 338, 511 A.2d at 126.
17

Id.

18 Id. Although Van Winkle "vigorously contested" knowledge of the SBA loan,
the trial court determined that such knowledge existed no earlier than June 3,
1980. Id. The appellate division later affirmed that determination, but held that
the non-disclosure was immaterial since Van Winkle did not void the listing agreement at that point, but rather proceeded to procure a buyer. Van Winkle & Liggett
and Latoracco [sic] Realty Corp. v. G.B.R. Francis [sic], Inc., A-768-83T3, A-123983T3, slip op. at 1-2 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Nov. 19, 1984).
19 Van Winkle, 103 N.J. at 338, 511 A.2d at 126.
20 Id. In a letter to GBR, Van Winkle also reiterated the commission clause of
the listing agreement. Id.
21 Id. at 338-39, 511 A.2d at 126.
22 Id. at 339, 511 A.2d at 127.
23 Id.
24 Id. In a letter to the SBA, GBR assured them that "the sale of the real property would benefit both the S.B.A. and the borrowers. The borrowers would be
free of some of the ownership costs and the S.B.A. would have a more liquid secur-

186

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 18:183

the loan. 25 GBR consequently terminated its contract with Columns
pursuant to the contingency clause.2 6
Van Winkle and Latorraca filed suit against GBR to recover the
broker's commission in the amount of $18,900.27 In a counterclaim,
GBR alleged breach of fiduciary duty, malicious prosecution, and
fraud. 28 The trial court awarded Van Winkle the commission because as a matter of law, the seller owed a duty to the broker to
refrain from unreasonably preventing the consummation of the
sale. 29 The lower court held that GBR prevented the consummation
of the transaction by offering "unreasonable conditions for release
of the SBA mortgage." '
Additionally, the court concluded that
although GBR had a duty to disclose the SBA mortgage at the signing of the listing agreement, Van Winkle had waived its rights resulting from GBR's non-disclosure by using their best efforts to
consummate the sale.3 '
ity." Id. at 340, 511 A.2d at 127 (quoting Letter from Samuel Bornstein, counsel
for GBR, to Howard Epstein, of the SBA (June 20, 1980)).
25 Id. The SBA asserted that, "[t]he purpose of this reduced rate loan was to
fulfill a need resulting from a natural disaster and the real estate collateral was
required as the business collateral was inadequate to secure the loan." Id. (citation
omitted). The SBA consistently refused to approve GBR's and Columns' proposal
to release the mortgage in exchange for substitute collateral.
26 Id. at 340-41, 511 A.2d at 128.
27 Id. at 341, 511 A.2d at 128. In a letter to GBR's attorney, the SBA expressed
a willingness to release the mortgage in return for the proceeds of the sale of the
property "unless there [was] a compelling business reason." Id. at 340, 511 A.2d at
127. Apparently, GBR chose not to exercise this option, and instead proffered
their opinion that the collateral substitution was "undoubtedly more marketable"
than the property itself. Id., 511 A.2d at 128 (quoting Letter from Samuel Bornstein, counsel for GBR, to Ronald Langell, acting chief portfolio manager of the
SBA (July 16, 1980)).
28 Id. at 341, 511 A.2d at 128. During the negotiations for the contract of sale,
Van Winkle informed GBR that the principal shareholder of Columns was also a
licensed real estate broker with Latorraca Realty who would be sharing in the commission. Van Winkle & Liggett v. G.B.R. Fabrics, No. L-68453-78, at 11-12 (NJ.
Super. Ct. Law Div. Sept. 18, 1983) (transcript of oral decision). The trial court
held that since GBR subsequently attempted to obtain the SBA release, they waived
any rights flowing from Van Winkle's failure to disclose the buyer's dual status in a
timely manner. Id. at 17-19.
29 103 N.J. at 341, 511 A.2d at 128. Although the trial court acknowledged that
GBR had "full discretion" to set the terms of the sales contract, it found that their
terms were unreasonable. See Van Winkle, No. L-68453-78, at 10-11 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. Sept. 18, 1983) (transcript of oral decision). The trial court also dismissed
Latorraca's claim. Van Winkle, 103 N.J. at 341 n.3, 511 A.2d at 128 n.3. The dismissal of the claim was not raised on appeal. Id.
30 Van Winkle, 103 N.J. at 341, 511 A.2d at 128. The trial court held that the
SBA properly rejected the proposed collateral substitution by GBR as a condition
for the mortgage's release. Id.
31 Id. See Van Winkle & Liggett v. G.B.R. Francis, [sic], Inc., Nos. A-768-83T3,
A-1239-83T3, slip op. at 2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 19, 1984).
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The appellate division affirmed the trial court's decision.3 2 The
Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification.3 3 In reversing
the appellate division's decision, the court held that "absent bad
faith or special circumstances, the threshold standard for imposing
liability on a seller for a brokerage commission in an aborted real
estate transaction is a finding that the seller committed a breach of
34
the sales contract."

To the extent that the majority rule afforded a broker protection for bringing buyer and seller together, the harsh reality was
that it placed the seller in a no-win situation, especially where the
transaction was abandoned due to circumstances beyond the seller's
control. 3 5 Many sellers attempted to avoid the inevitable by inserting commission clauses in brokerage agreements and contracts
of sale, or conditioning payment of commission upon a certain date
or event.36 New Jersey courts, vexed by the interpretation of the
ambiguous terms of these provisions, opted to construe these terms
as "time" or "contingency" clauses. 3 7 When an agreement involved
a "time" provision, the broker earned his commission when the
buyer and seller signed the contract of sale.3 8 In such instances,
courts deferred payment until the closing date, regardless of the
transaction's failure to materialize. 3 9 If an agreement contained a
"contingency" clause, however, the broker's right to a commission
40
fixed upon the happening of a specified event.
32
33
34
35

Id. at 3.
Van Winkle, 102 N.J. 333, 508 A.2d 210 (1985).
Van Winkle, 103 N.J. at 349, 511 A.2d at 132.
See generally Note, Seller Beware, supra note 2; Note, A Reexamination, supra note

2.
36 See Hinds v. Henry, 36 N.J.L. 328 (1873). See infra notes 41-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of Hinds.
37 Note, A Reexamination, supra note 2, at 87.
38 See, e.g., Steinberg v. Mindlin, 96 N.J.L. 206, 114 A. 451 (1921); Courter v.
Lydecker, 71 N.J.L. 511, 58 A. 1093 (Sup. Ct. 1904).
39 See, e.g., Mercner v. Fay, 71 N.J. Super. 519, 522, 177 A.2d 481,482 (App. Div.
1962) ("on date set for closing of title"); Winter v. Toldt, 32 N.J. Super. 443, 445,
108 A.2d 648, 649 (App. Div. 1954) ("upon the execution of the deed and the
closing of title");J.R. Tucker, Inc. v. Mahaffey, 6 N.J. Misc. 17, 18 (Sup. Ct. 1928)
("due and payable at time of final settlement").
40 See, e.g., Richard v. Falleti, 13 N.J. Super. 534, 536, 81 A.2d 17, 17 (App. Div.
1951) ("one-half on signing agreement for sale of property and the balance on
delivery of deed"); Leschziner v. Bauman, 83 N.J.L. 743, 743, 85 A. 205, 205
(1912) ("on the day of passing title orJuly 15th"); Dresser v. Gilbert, 81 N.J.L. 358,
359, 79 A. 1043, 1043 (Sup. Ct. 1911) ("for selling said property"); Hinds v.
Henry, 36 N.J.L. 328, 329 (1873) ("the first half thereof.., at the time that the
purchasers of the property hereinbefore mentioned shall pay over the first half of
the purchase money, and the balance at the expiration of one year from the date of
the deed").

188

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 18:183

In 1873, in Hinds v. Henry,4 ' a New Jersey appellate court4 2 established the general rule governing brokers' commissions in sales
contracts involving contingency clauses. On December 6, 1866,
Benjamin Hinds and Eugene Henry entered into an agreement by
which Hinds would have received a real estate commission if he effectuated the sale of Henry's property before January 15, 1867. 4
On January 9, the parties agreed to extend the terms of the sale to
March 15." On March 28, 1867, Hinds drafted a contract of sale
between Henry and the prospective purchasers of the property.4 5
The following day, Hinds and Henry re-executed the December 6,
1866 agreement.4 6 At the closing, the purchasers discovered a
cloud on the title to a portion of the land and withdrew from the
deal.4 7 Hinds brought an action against Henry to recover his bro49
ker's commission.4 8 The trial court held in favor of Henry.
In affirming the lower court's decision, the supreme court ruled
that a broker, as an agent, was entitled to recover for commissions
only in the presence of an employment contract and retainer by his
principal. 50 The court asserted that generally, a broker earned a
right to a commission when he procured a purchaser who was "able
36 N.J.L. 328 (Sup. Ct. 1873).
In 1844, the New Jersey Constitution provided that "the court of last resort"
would be named the Court of Errors and Appeals. PAUL AXEL-LUTE, NEW JERSEY
LEGAL RESEARCH HANDBOOK 59 (1984). In 1873, the New Jersey Supreme Court
was an intermediary court which exercised both original and appellate jurisdiction.
Id. Under the 1947 constitution, the Court of Errors and Appeals became the New
Jersey Supreme Court. Id.
43 Hinds, 36 N.J.L. at 328. Henry owned approximately thirteen hundred acres
of land in Pennsylvania. Id. Henry's father acquired a portion of the land referred
to as the Paschal tract at a tax sale. Id. at 328-29.
44 Id. The original agreement stipulated that Hinds was entitled to a commission for any amount received for the property over $12,000. Id. at 328. The subsequent time extension did not affect the terms of the commission. See id. at 328-29.
45 Id. at 329. On February 18, 1867, Henry gave Hinds power of attorney to
make all the necessary agreements for the sale of the property. Id. The contract of
sale conveyed the property "in fee simple, clear of all encumbrances, for the sum of
$15,000." Id.
46 Id. The new agreement stipulated that Hinds was entitled to a $3,000 commission payable to him, "the first half thereof (say $1500), at the time that the
purchasers of the property hereinbefore mentioned shall pay over the first half of
the purchase money, and the balance at the expiration of one year from the date of
the deed for said property ...... Id.
47 Id. at 329-30. The encumbrance was a tax title on the Paschal tract. Id. at
329. The tax title was later determined to be worthless. Id. at 334.
48 Id. at 330. Hinds sued on the contract of March 29, 1867 for services rendered in negotiating the sale. Id.
49 Id. The trial court heard the case without a jury. Id.
50 Id. The court added that "[s]ervices rendered as a mere volunteer, without
any employment, express or implied" gave no right to a brokerage commission. Id.
41
42
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and willing" to comply with the terms of the sale. 5 Additionally,
the court acknowledged that a broker was entitled to contract with
the seller by conditioning his commission upon the occurrence of a
specified event.5" Furthermore, the court indicated that where a
broker's commission was contingent upon a certain event, regardless of whether the event was within his control, the terms of the
contract determined the rights and liabilities of the parties. 53 The
court noted that due to the defect in title, none of the contingencies
occurred.5 4 The court concluded that a commission is recoverable,
despite the absence of the specified event, where the sale was pre5
vented by the seller's willful or fraudulent conduct.
In Murray Apfelbaum, Inc. v. Topf,56 the court considered the
57
seller's conduct in relation to an agreement's contingency clause.
In Apfelbaum, the seller and broker entered into an agreement which
provided that the seller would pay a commission when the broker
effectuated the sale pursuant to the contract terms. 5 8 The agreement further stipulated that the seller was under no obligation to
pay the broker if the title failed to pass, unless such failure resulted
from the seller's "default." 5 9 The broker produced a buyer, and the
51

Id. at 332. The court observed that this premise "rests upon the general us-

age of the business, and is liable to be modified or superseded by a special usage in

relation to the particular transaction, in connection with which the broker was employed, or by special agreement between the parties." Id.
52 Id. Although a broker was free to condition his commission upon a contingency, the court indicated that he might be bound by "a contingency which his
efforts cannot control, even though it relate[s] to the acts of his principal." Id.
53 See id. at 330.
54 Id. at 333. The Hinds court determined that Hinds' employment contract expired on March 15, 1867. Id. at 331. The court opined that services performed
thereafter were voluntary and therefore merited no compensation. Id. As to the
March 29, 1867 agreement, the court asserted that the broker's commission was
contingent upon the purchaser's payment of one-half of the purchase price and a
one year passage of time from the date of the deed's delivery. Id. at 333.
55 Id. at 333-34. The court found that the "defendant made no fraudulent concealment of the defect in his title, and that [Hinds] acted with full knowledge that
his efforts might be made abortive by the defendant's inability to convey .
Id.
at 335.
56 104 N.J.L. 343, 140 A. 295 (1928).
57 Id.
58 Id. at 344, 140 A. at 296. The Topfs agreed to pay "three and one-half per
cent. [sic] on the first $20,000 of the purchase price and two and one-half per cent.
[sic] on the balance thereof." Id. Apfelbaum sought to recover a total commission
of $3,575. Id.
59 Id. In the agreement between Apfelbaum and the Topfs, the Topfs stated that
they would be liable "only in the event of passing of title or in the event of failure to
pass title, through our default." Id.

190

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:183

parties entered into a contract of sale. 6 ° After a title search revealed
that the property was subject to restrictions contained in an earlier
deed in the chain of title, the prospective buyers withdrew from the
sale. 6 ' In an action to recover damages, the broker alleged that
under the contract the seller's failure to convey clear title constituted default, and thus rendered the seller liable for the
62
commission.

The Apfelbaum court acknowledged the vendee's right to legitimately refuse a defective title.63 The court stated that unless the
seller fraudulently concealed the defect or prevented the passage of
title by some other willful act, the seller would not be obligated to
pay the broker's commission.6 4 The court also construed the word
"default" as it appeared in the agreement to mean "some willful act
done... to defeat the passing of the title, and the consummation of
the sale."

65

Eleven years later, in Lippincott v. Content,66 New Jersey's highest
court interpreted a commission clause where the seller and the proposed buyer modified their original contract to allow the filing of a
60 Id. at 345, 140 A. at 296. The contract of sale called for a purchase price of
$135,000. Id.
61 Id. The earlier deed in the chain of title contained a covenant which restricted
the use of the property for
any brewery, slaughter house, glue or chemical factory of any kind, any
beer saloon, beer cellar or any place in which beer, wines or liquors shall
be sold, or any building in which shall be carried on any business offensive, noxious or detrimental to the use of said land or the adjoining or
contiguous land or any part of the same for private residence, nor shall
said land be used for any purpose which would create a nuisance.

Id.

Id. at 344, 140 A. at 296.
Id. at 346, 140 A. at 296.
Id. at 346-47, 140 A. at 296-97. Regarding the restrictive covenants which
were held not to have been released or canceled by the trial court, the Apfelbaum
court found it unnecessary to consider
whether or not they had ceased to be of any legal force, since the adoption of the eighteenth constitutional amendment, the Volstead [a]ct, and
the statutes of this state, and under the ordinances of the municipality,
in which the premises are situated, by reason of the legislation referred
to, and whereby the restrictions had become mere personal covenants
to be entered into by a purchaser to refrain from committing violations
of law, and, hence, now relate to personal conduct of the owner of land,
and not to the use of the land for any and all lawful purpose or
purposes.
Id. at 346, 140 A.2d at 296. The court instead focused on the issue of whether "the
failure to pass title" resulted from the seller's default. Id.
65 Id. at 347, 140 A. at 297. The Apfelbaum court found that the case was "utterly
barren" of any willful misconduct on the part of the Topfs or any evidence indicating that they knew of any restrictions on the use of the land. Id.
66 123 N.J.L. 277, 8 A.2d 362 (1939).
62
63
64
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suit by the owner to quiet title.6 7 When the seller's action to quiet
title was unsuccessful, the purchaser terminated the contract. 6 8
Although the sale was never consummated, the broker sued on the
contract which provided for the "commission to be paid in consideration of services rendered in consummating this sale ... to become
due and payable upon [the] closing [of] title." 6 9 The court held in
70
favor of the seller.
In reaffirming the legality of commission clauses, the Lippincott
court noted that the parties were bound by the terms of those
clauses if they incorporated them in the contract of sale. 7' The
court maintained that although the contract clauses were specific,
the agreement did not clearly indicate that the broker's commission
was contingent upon the passage of title. 72 The parties' conduct, as
well as the wording of the agreement, indicated to the court that the
passage of title was "requisite performance" to the broker's right to
a commission.7 3
In Alexander Summer Co. v. Weil,7 the appellate division undertook a further analysis of the seller's conduct in a title-defect case.7 5
The broker and the seller entered into a listing agreement, which
they subsequently modified. 7 6 The modified agreement stipulated
that the broker was entitled to a commission "payable if, as, and
67 Id. at 278, 8 A.2d at 362. The buyer and seller subsequently postponed the
closing date. Id. at 278-79, 8 A.2d at 362.
68 Id. at 279, 8 A.2d at 362. In the trial court, the seller claimed ownership by
adverse possession. Content v. Dalton, 122 N.J. Eq. 425, 426-27, 194 A. 286, 287
(1937). The NewJersey Court of Errors and Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Id. at 440, 194 A. at 294.
69 Lippincott at 279, 8 A.2d at 362.
70 Id. at 280, 8 A.2d at 363. In affirming the trial court's decision, the Court of
Errors and Appeals held that: "Since the actual passing of title to the property was
a necessary condition to fulfillment of the right to the commission, omission of that
element left the claim of the agent incomplete. Direction of a verdict in favor of the
defendant owner was therefore appropriate." Id.
71 Id. at 279, 8 A.2d at 363. The Lippincott court declared that the parties' freedom to contract was "subject only to legality of the purpose, and the consideration
of public policy." Id.
72 Id. at 279-80, 8 A.2d at 363. The Lippincott court indicated that the agreement
in question was the result of poor draftsmanship. See id. at 280, 8 A.2d at 363. The
court opined that language of the agreement "in consummating this sale" and
-upon closing title" was sufficient to show that the closing was more than a "chronological marking." Id. at 280, 8 A.2d at 363.
73 Id. at 280, 8 A.2d at 363.
74 16 N.J. Super. 94, 83 A.2d 787 (App. Div. 1951).

75

Id.

Id. at 96, 83 A.2d at 787. The modification was in response to an option
agreement between the buyer and seller. Id. at 96-97, 83 A.2d at 788. It stipulated
that if the seller was unable to convey clear title, she would have the option to
rectify the situation within thirty days. Id. at 96, 83 A.2d at 788. Additionally, the
76
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when title closes, and not otherwise." 7 7 The purchaser conducted a
title search which revealed that the property was subject to a reservation within an earlier deed." The seller failed to locate any heirs
or descendants of the original grantor, and the purchasers refused
to proceed with the transaction. 79 In his action to recover the commission, the broker alleged that the seller's failure to disclose and
remove the defect in title prevented the actual passage of title.8 0
The trial court granted the seller's motion for summary judgment."' In affirming the lower court's decision, the appellate court
construed the commission clause as making the passage of title a
condition precedent to the seller's liability for payment.8 2 Citing
the Apfelbaum holding,8 3 the court stated that the condition precedent would not be excused unless the seller fraudulently concealed
the defect or prevented the passage of title by some other willful
act.8 4
The supreme court similarly imposed a good faith standard as a
defense to a contingency clause in a seller-broker agreement in Blau
v. Friedman.8 5 In 1947, Morris Friedman and his mother Sarah
Friedman, co-owners of an apartment building, created a trust
which named Morris as a trustee for his mother's half of the propagreement provided that if the seller failed to remove the defect, she would return
any money which she had received from the buyer. Id.
77 Id. at 97, 83 A.2d at 788.
78 Id. In 1848, the grantor reserved a portion of the land to be used as a "burying ground." Id.
79 Id. at 98, 83 A.2d at 789. In her attempt to locate the heirs of the original
grantor, the seller examined genealogy records, cemetery records and even tombstones. Id.
80 Id. at 97, 83 A.2d at 788. The seller's father acquired the property approximately 30 years before the case came to court. Id. at 98, 83 A.2d at 788-89. The
seller's attorney proffered a warranty deed with affidavits attesting to "open, continued, adverse and notorious possession of the [land] for more than 29 years ......
Id., 83 A.2d at 789. The purchasers refused to accept the deed. Id.
81 Id. at 96, 83 A.2d at 787.
82 Id. at 99, 83 A.2d at 789 (citing Lippincott v. Content, 123 N.J.L. 277, 8 A.2d
362 (1939); Murray Apfelbaum, Inc. v. Topf, 104 N.J.L. 343, 140 A. 295 (1928)).
83 Id. at 100-01, 83 A.2d at 790. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
84 Summer, 16 N.J. Super. at 100-01, 83 A.2d at 790. The court noted that
neither the complaint nor the facts gave rise to the issue of whether the seller fraudulently concealed the defect in the chain of title. Id. at 101, 83 A.2d at 790.
The Summer court borrowed the language of the Apfelbaum court:
The case is utterly barren of any testimony or circumstance indicating
that the respondents even knew of the existence of the restrictions in the
ancient deed, or of any willful act on their part to which the failure to
pass title and consummate the sale was due.
Id. (quoting Apfelbaum, 104 N.J.L. at 347, 140 A. at 297).
85 26 N.J. 397, 140 A.2d 193 (1958).
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erty and granted him full power of sale.86 Five years later, Sarah
revoked her son's power of sale-without his knowledge.8 7 In 1956,
Morris, his wife and a broker signed an agreement authorizing the
broker to sell the apartment building with a commission payable
upon the passage of title.8 8 The broker procured a purchaser for
the Friedmans' property. 8 9 Morris instructed his attorney to draw
the contract of sale, and subsequently learned about his mother's
revocation of the trust.90 Sarah refused to participate in the sale and
the buyer declined to proceed with the transaction. 9'
The broker sued to recover the commission he alleged he
would have received if the Friedmans had not misrepresented their
ownership of the property.9 2 In holding for the plaintiff, the trial
court determined that regardless of Morris's knowledge of the revocation, his power of sale was not the equivalent of ownership.9 3 The
court concluded that the contingency agreement would not deprive
the broker of his right to a commission when he procured a "ready,
willing and able" purchaser in reliance upon the Friedmans' misrepresentation. 9 4 The appellate division affirmed holding that in light
of Morris's misrepresentation, even if made in good faith, the contingency clause could not shield him from liability.9 5
86 Id. at 398, 140 A.2d at 193-94. Although Morris and his mother purchased
the building together, only Morris's name appeared on the deed. Id. at 398, 140
A.2d at 193.
87 Id. at 398-99, 140 A.2d at 194.
88 Id. at 399, 140 A.2d at 194. The agreement stipulated that the commission
was payable "if, as and when title to the property actually passes to the purchaser."
Id. Additionally, since the sellers signed an exclusive agency listing agreement, the
commission was payable to the broker, regardless of who produced the buyer. Blau
v. Friedman, 46 N.J. Super. 573, 576, 135 A.2d 227, 228 (App. Div. 1957).
89 Blau, 26 N.J. at 399, 140 A.2d at 194.
90 Id. Morris and Sarah Friedman shared the same attorney. Id.
91 Id. Eager to sell, Morris offered to sell his half of the property, but the purchaser rejected the offer. Id. Morris also offered the broker a perpetual exclusive
agency listing on the property. Id. The broker declined that offer. Id.
92 Id. at 399-400, 140 A.2d at 194. At trial, the seller's attorney testified that the
broker knew of Sarah's interest in the property. Id. at 403-04, 140 A.2d at 196.
The trial court did not expressly decide this issue. Id.
93 Id. at 400, 140 A.2d at 194. The trial court awarded the broker $5,685, which
represented 5% of the $113,700 sales price stipulated in the agreement. Blau, 46
N.J. Super. at 576, 135 A.2d at 228-29.
94 Blau, 26 N.J. at 400, 140 A.2d at 194-95. The basis for the trial court's decision was that the defendants represented themselves as owners of the property
"when in fact they knew they only owned a portion of it." Id. at 400, 140 A.2d at
194.
95 Blau, 46 N.J. Super. at 580-81, 135 A.2d at 231. The appellate court concluded that:
At best, we are asked to envision a situation in a scenic environment in
which the vendors actually deceived their broker but did not mean to do
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The supreme court reversed and held that the lower courts had
erroneously disregarded Morris's knowledge of Sarah's revocation
as immaterial. 96 The court maintained that if the defendants knew
or had reason to know of Sarah's revocation, they could not invoke
the contingency clause as a defense.9 7 Conversely, the court asserted that, if the sellers acted in good faith, and with the conscientious belief in their legal power as owners, the contingency clause
protected them from liability for the broker's commission.9 8
The supreme court in Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson addressed
the issue of a seller's liability for a brokerage commission where the
sale failed due to the prospective buyer's default.9 9 In 1960, the
Johnsons authorized Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. to sell their 144 acre
farm property.' 0 0 Iarussi, a real estate developer, had contacted the
Dobbs agency to assist him in the acquisition and purchase of property."' 1 After Dobbs introduced Iarussi to the Johnsons, the
prospective buyer and sellers entered into an oral agreement of
sale. 0 2 larussi, however, failed to obtain financing, and the deal
so. In such an exigency of affairs, will the law permit the defendants to
utilize the contingency clause as a shield to insulate them ex aequo et bono
from rewarding the plaintiff for his acknowledged services? Upon mature consideration our answer is to the contrary.
Id.
96 Blau, 26 NJ. at 404, 140 A.2d at 196. The supreme court held that the trial
and appellate courts made no inquiries into the sellers' good faith or conscientious
belief in their legal power, as owners, to sell the premises. Id. On this basis, the
supreme court remanded the issue of whether the seller acted in good faith for
further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Id.
97 Id. at 403, 140 A.2d at 196 (citing Murray Apfelbaum, Inc. v. Topf, 104 NJ.L.
343, 140 A. 295 (1928). According to the Blau court, the contingency clause
shielded the sellers from liability for the commission "unless . . . they fraudulently
concealed the limited nature of their title to the property or engaged in some other
willful act which prevented the consummation of the sale." Id.
98 Id. The supreme court noted that the sellers signed the exclusive listing
agreement on a form prepared by the broker "with his own choice of language."
Id. at 403, 140 A.2d at 196. The court held that if the sellers viewed the terms of the
agreement as "simply descriptive of the property and their ability to convey it,"
then their conduct could not be characterized as fraudulent or intentionally misleading. Id.
99 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843 (1967).
100 Id. at 536, 236 A.2d at 847. The Johnsons also listed the property for sale
with several other agencies. Id.
101 Id. Iarussi was interested primarily in acquiring the property for residential
development. Id. at 536-37, 236 A.2d at 847. According to the broker, Iarussi
agreed that if Dobbs successfully located satisfactory property, Iarussi would enter
into a contract of sale with the seller, who would pay Dobbs' commission. Id. at
536, 236 A.2d at 847. At trial, larussi admitted that Dobbs had previously assisted
him in acquiring "at least four pieces of property." Id. at 537, 236 A.2d at 847. In
each of these transactions, the seller paid Dobbs a commission. Id.
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collapsed.
The following year, Iarussi met with theJohnsons again, and on
May 1, 1961, they entered into a contract of sale, and set the closing
date for September 1 of that year." 4 The parties agreed that the
Johnsons would pay the Dobbs agency a commission for "services
rendered in consummating [the] sale" in accordance with the terms
of the contract.'0 5 At the closing, Iarussi revealed that his attempts
to secure financing again were futile, and the Johnsons granted his
request for an extension of time until February 20, 1962.106 At this
new closing date, despite larussi's claim that he had acquired the
necessary backing, a disagreement arose over the prior extension
agreement and the closing again failed.' 0 7 larussi instituted an acId.
Id. The Ellsworth Dobbs court noted conflicting testimony with regard to
Iarussi's financial ability to complete the transaction. Id. at 537-38, 236 A.2d at
847-48. According to the Johnsons, the Dobbs agency assured them that larussi
would be financially able to consummate the deal. Id. at 537, 236 A.2d at 847.
Iarussi contended that Dobbs offered assistance in securing the necessary financial
backing. Id. at 538, 236 A.2d at 847-48. The Dobbs agency denied any discussion
of financial assistance with Iarussi. Id. at 538, 236 A.2d at 848.
105 Id. at 539, 236 A.2d at 848. The contract of sale provided for a purchase
money note and mortgage. Id. at 538, 236 A.2d at 848. In addition, theJohnsons
agreed to release the mortgage, one lot at a time, for each payment of $2,500. Id.
The contract further stipulated that the sellers pay the broker's commission in
installments:
The commission hereinafter mentioned shall be payable as follows:
$5,000[] when sellers shall have received a total of $25,000[ ] on account of the above purchase price ($10,000[ ] herewith and $15,000[]
on account of the principal sum of the above mentioned purchase
money note and mortgage); an additional $5,000[] when an additional
$25,000[] shall have been paid on account of the principal sum of
purchase money note and mortgage; and the remaining $5,000[ ] when
an additional $25,000[ ] shall have been paid on account of the principal
sum of said purchase money note and mortgage. The entire commission of $15,000[] shall become immediately due and payable upon any
sale or assignment by sellers of said purchase money note and
mortgage.
Id. at 539, 236 A.2d at 848.
106 See id. at 539-40, 236 A.2d at 848-49. By September 1, 1961, the Johnsons
received $2,500 from larussi. Id. at 539, 236 A.2d at 848. The Johnsons testified
that they agreed to extend the closing date in return for Iarussi's promise to pay the
property taxes from September 1 until the new closing date of February 20, 1962.
Id. The Johnsons, eager to close the sale, assisted Iarussi in his efforts to obtain a
financial backer. See id., 236 A.2d at 849. Dismayed with the "lack of progress," the
Johnsons approached the broker from the Dobbs agency, who agreed to lower the
commission from $15,000 to $10,000 if theJohnsons sent a "time-of-the-essence"
letter to Iarussi. Id. at 539-40, 236 A.2d at 849. The letter was sent to Iarussi on
February 9, 1962. Id. at 540, 236 A.2d at 849.
107 Id. The dispute concerned Iarussi's failure to pay the interest and taxes which
he allegedly agreed to do when theJohnsons had granted him an extension of time.
103
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tion for specific performance, claiming that he was "ready and willing" to buy.' 018 The Johnsons, who filed an answer asserting their
willingness to proceed with the deal asked the court to set another
closing date.'0 9 The trial court granted the Johnsons' motion for a
summary judgment and ordered a closing date set for "not later
than May 15, 1962. " "1Io On that date, Iarussi announced that he had
lost his financial backing, and the closing failed for the fourth and
final time. 1 '
Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. filed suit against theJohnsons and Iarussi
to recover the brokerage commission.12 The trial court interpreted
the commission clause as a time provision and held that the broker
earned his commission when the buyer and the seller executed their
contract of sale.'' The trial court held that, in the alternative, if the
commission clause was a contingency provision, the parties' mutual
releases prevented the fulfillment of the contingency under the con4 In holding that a jury question existed as to the
tract. 1 "
Johnsons'
Id. Although Iarussi denied that he had ever agreed to such terms specifically, he
admitted in an affidavit that he "never denied he would pay the Johnsons something for interest and taxes .... " Id. at 539, 236 A.2d at 848-49.
108 Id. at 540, 236 A.2d at 849.
109 Id. In addition to their answer, the Johnsons counterclaimed requesting specific performance and also sought a judgment to enforce larussi's agreement to pay
the interest and taxes. Id.
110 Id. The trial court transferred the Johnsons' damages claim for the interest
and taxes to the Law Division of the New Jersey Superior Court. Id.
S11Id. at 540-41, 236 A.2d at 849. When the closing failed, the Johnsons' attorney advised them that they would be unable to sell their land if they pursued further legal action against Iarussi. Id. at 541, 236 A.2d at 849. larussi realized that he
was confronted with thejudgment for specific performance and with the suit for the
payment of interest and taxes. Id. Both parties executed written mutual releases
and discharged their mutual obligations under the contract of sale. Id. at 541, 236
A.2d at 850. Under the terms of their respective releases, theJohnsons agreed to
refund larussi's $2,500 down payment when they received $25,000 cash from the
next prospective buyer. Id. at 541-42, 236 A.2d at 850. The parties also agreed to
drop the suit pending in the superior court. Id. at 542, 236 A.2d at 850. In return,
Iarussi stipulated that he would turn over to theJohnsons "all maps, surveys, plans
and engineering data" relating to the subdivision of the land, and that he would
"save the Johnsons harmless from any commission claim" made by the Dobbs
agency. Id.
112 Id. The Dobbs agency sought to recover a $15,000 commission with interest
accruing from the final closing date. Id.
113 Id. The Johnsons urged the trial court to consider their dilemma resulting
from larussi's frustrating conduct. Id. Relying on established law, the trial court
refused to consider their argument. Id.
114 Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 92 N.J. Super. 271, 277, 223 A.2d 199, 202
(App. Div. 1966). The trial court held that a determination of larussi's liability
raised a jury question as to whether larussi "breach[ed] an implied agreement with
[his] broker to complete the transaction." Ellsworth Dobbs, 50 N.J. at 543, 236 A.2d
at 850. The jury found that an implied agreement existed, and that larussi
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liability, the appellate division reversed the trial court's decision and
remanded for a determination of that issue." 5 The New Jersey
Supreme Court reversed the appellate division's decision to remand
the issue of seller liability, and held that the trial court erred in im16
posing liability on the Johnsons for the brokerage commission."
The supreme court held that as a matter of law "a broker is not
entitled to [a] commission from the seller if title does not pass because of the inability or fault of the customer ...."',"
Justice Francis, writing for the court, initially undertook a comprehensive analysis of the traditional legal principles governing a
brokerage commission.' 8 The justice posited that in a realistic setting, the relationship between the seller and the broker was based
on the seller's reasonable expectation that the broker's commission
would be derived from the proceeds of the sale." 9 The court mainbreached the agreement by failing to perform under the terms of the contract of
sale. Id. at 535, 236 A.2d at 846. Rather than submit the issue of the Johnsons'
liability to the jury, the trial judge instructed the jury to find for the broker and to
assess the amount of commission due him. Id. The jury found that larussi was
liable for the $15,000 commission. Ellsworth Dobbs, 92 N.J. Super. at 277, 223 A.2d
at 202.
''5
Id. at 282, 223 A.2d at 205. The appellate division also held that the trial
court erred in submitting the issue of Iarussi's liability to the jury. Id. at 283, 223
A.2d at 205.
116 Ellsworth Dobbs, 50 N.J. at 562, 236 A.2d at 861. The supreme court asserted
that contrary to the trial court's holding, the issue of arussi's liability was a question for thejury. Id. at 543, 236 A.2d at 850. The court further declared that ajury
question existed as to whether Dobbs understood and agreed "expressly or impliedly" to a contingency provision in the commission agreement. Id. at 562, 236
A.2d at 861. The court stated that if the jury found for Iarussi on the latter issue,
Dobbs would have no right to a commission. Id.
117 Id. at 555, 236 A.2d at 857. Justice Francis summarized the rule governing
brokerage commissions as follows:
When a broker is engaged by an owner of property to find a purchaser
for it, the broker earns his commission when (a) he produces a purchaser ready, willing and able to buy on the terms fixed by the owner,
(b) the purchaser enters into a binding contract with the owner to do so,
and (c) the purchaser completes the transaction by closing the title in
accordance with the provisions of the contract.
Id. at 551, 236 A.2d at 855. The court premised the decision on public policy
grounds which traditionally looked upon the broker as a fiduciary and required him
to exercise "fidelity, good faith and primary devotion to the interests of his principal." Id. at 553, 236 A.2d at 856 (citing Wilcox v. Reynolds, 169 Okla. 153, 36 P.2d
488 (1934); Haydock v. Stow, 40 N.Y. 363 (1869)).
118 Ellsworth Dobbs, 50 N.J. at 543-61, 236 A.2d at 850-60.
119 Id. at 547, 236 A.2d at 852-53. The court stated that:
There can be no doubt that ordinarily when an owner of property lists it
with a broker for sale, his expectation is that the money for the payment
of commission will come out of the proceeds of the sale. He expects
that if the broker produces a buyer to whom the owner's terms of sale
are satisfactory, and a contract embodying those terms is executed, the
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tained that the seller could similarly anticipate liability for a commission if the failure to close title was due primarily to his wrongful or
frustrating conduct. 120 The court then held that regardless of special contingency agreements based on the passage of title, 12 1 the
general rule governing the broker-seller relationship was "absent
default by the owner, the contract of sale must be performed by the
buyer before liability for commission is imposed upon the
owner.' 2 2 Nearly twenty years later, in Van Winkle & Liggett v.
G.B.R. Fabrics, Inc., the New Jersey Supreme Court considered the
result of the Ellsworth Dobbs decision in the context of a seller's
23
default. 1
buyer will perform, i.e. he will pay the consideration and accept the deed
at the time agreed upon. Considering the realities of the relationship
created between owner and broker, that expectation of the owner is a
reasonable one, and, in our view, entirely consistent with what should
be the expectation of a conscientious broker as to the kind of ready,
willing and able purchaser his engagement calls upon him to tender to
the owner.
Id.
Id. at 548, 236 A.2d at 853.
Id. at 551, 236 A.2d at 855. Unlike prior courts' handling of cases involving
contingency agreements, the Ellsworth Dobbs decision hinged on its interpretation of
the "ready, willing and able" theory rather than the closing of title. Id. This decision, however, had the same effect, because the closing was the event by which the
purchaser's ability to perform would bejudged. Note, A Reexamination, supra note 2,
at 87-88 n.35 (1968).
122 Ellsworth Dobbs, 50 N.J. at 551, 236 A.2d at 855. The Ellsworth Dobbs court,
concerned with the "substantial inequality of bargaining power" between the seller
and the broker, sought to reinforce the protection afforded the unsophisticated
seller by restricting the broker's freedom to contract unfairly. Id. at 555, 236 A.2d
at 857.
123 103 N.J. at 335, 511 A.2d at 124. Other states have accepted some form of
the Ellsworth Dobbs rule. See, e.g., Drake v. Hosley, 713 P.2d 1203 (Alaska 1986);
Potter v. Ridge Realty Corp., 28 Conn. Supp. 304, 259 A.2d 758 (Super. Ct. 1969);
Strout Realty, Inc. v. Milhous, 107 Idaho 330, 689 P.2d 222 (Ct. App. 1984); Mullenger v. Clause, 178 N.W.2d 420 (Iowa 1970); Winkelman v. Allen, 214 Kan. 22,
519 P.2d 1377 (1974); Tristram's Landing, Inc. v. Wait, 367 Mass. 622, 327 N.E.2d
727 (1975); Associated Agency of Bozeman, Inc. v. Pasha, 625 P.2d 38 (Mont.
1981); Cornett v. Nathan, 196 Neb. 277, 242 N.W.2d 855 (1976); Goetz v. Anderson, 274 N.W.2d 175 (N.D. 1978); Setser v. Commonwealth, Inc., 256 Or. 11, 470
P.2d 142 (1970); see also, e.g., Adams v. Adams, 283 So.2d 503 (La. Ct. App. 1973).
Cf., Taylor Real Estate & Ins. Co. v. Greene, 274 Ala. 694, 151 So.2d 397 (1963).
Colorado codified the rule entitling brokers to commissions as follows:
No real estate agent or broker is entitled to a commission for finding a
purchaser who is ready, willing, and able to complete the purchase of
real estate as proposed by the owner until the same is consummated or
is defeated by the refusal or neglect of the owner to consummate the
same as agreed upon.
CoLo. REV. STAT. § 12-61-201 (1985). As of this writing, New Jersey has not yet
codified the Ellsworth Dobbs rule. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:15-1 to -33 (West 1986).
120
121
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In Van Winkle, the supreme court noted that while Ellsworth
Dobbs settled the constructional difficulties associated with contingency clauses, the decision fell short of delineating the types of
seller default that would render a seller liable for the payment of a
brokerage commission.124 Writing for the court, Justice Stein observed that "other decisions make it clear that a seller does not become liable for a commission merely because its conduct is a
25
contributing factor in the breakdown of the sales transaction.'
The court articulated the general rule that the seller's inability
to convey clear title constituted default. 12 6 However, the court further noted that this kind of default did not necessarily render the
seller liable to the broker for the commission even though it may
have contributed to the collapse of the sales transaction. 2 7 On the
other hand, the court posited that where the seller's inability to perform was related to a willful or fraudulent act, or a "purely capricious refusal to act," liability would be imposed.' 28 The court
observed that the "fraudulent-willful" terminology had been extended to a case where the seller had "innocently misrepresented
the quantity of land." 12 9 The court then determined that where the
seller prevented the consummation of the sale as the result of
"wrongful, fraudulent, willful or capricious" conduct, the seller
would be estopped from invoking the contingency clause in order to
avoid liability. 3 0
Van Winkle, 103 N.J. at 344, 511 A.2d at 130.
Id. See also infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
Van Winkle, 103 N.J. at 344, 511 A.2d at 130 (citing Conklin v. Davi, 76 N.J.
468, 388 A.2d 598 (1978); LaSalle v. LaPointe, 14 N.J. 476, 102 A.2d 761 (1954)).
127 Id. at 344-45, 511 A.2d at 130 (citing Blau v. Friedman, 26 N.J. 397, 140 A.2d
193 (1958); Lippincott v. Content, 123 N.J.L. 277, 8 A.2d 362 (1939); Murray Apfelbaum, Inc. v. Topf, 104 N.J.L. 343, 140 A. 295 (1928); Alexander Summer v.
Weil, 16 N.J. Super. 94, 83 A.2d 787 (App. Div. 1951); Century 21-Candid Realty v.
Cliett, 203 N.J. Super. 78, 495 A.2d 920 (Law Div. 1985)).
The New Jersey Superior Court has held that a seller, who withdrew from the
contract of sale pursuant to an "attorney review clause," would not be held liable
for a broker's commission. Century 2 1-Candid Realty v. Cliett, 203 N.J. Super. 78,
81, 495 A.2d 920, 922 (Law Div. 1985). The Century 21 court declared that the
seller's right to rescind the contract, pursuant to an attorney review clause, would
be meaningless if the seller was held liable for the brokerage commission. Id. at 81,
495 A.2d at 922. The court further urged that the economic loss resulting from the
seller's liability, in such a situation, might have the effect of preventing the seller
from exercising his right to enforce the attorney review clause. Id.
128 Van Winkle, 103 N.J. at 345, 511 A.2d at 130 (quoting Alexander Summer v.
Weil, 16 N.J. Super. at 99, 83 A.2d at 787).
129 Id. (citing Gottlieb v. Connolly, 5 N.J. Misc. 372, 136 A. 599 (Sup. Ct. 1927)).
130 Van Winkle, 103 NJ. at 346, 511 A.2d at 131 (quoting Note, A Reexamination,
supra note 2, at 90). The court stated that the remedy afforded a broker in a situation involving a seller's misconduct is "equitable in nature and based on the princi124
125
126
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Justice Stein next examined GBR's conduct as it related to the
sales contract.'
The justice stated that the rights of a broker were
32
rights of the parties to the contract of sale.'
the
by
determined
Accordingly, Justice Stein noted that if the seller's conduct merely
contributed to the failure to close title, the broker was not entitled
to collect a commission. 133 Justice Stein indicated that in such instances the court would reject the broker's claim for a commission
34
against the seller if the seller had not breached the sales contract. 1
Justice Stein then reviewed the terms of the sales contract and
noted that the sale was conditioned explicitly on the SBA's release
3
of its mortgage in accordance with the terms proposed by GBR.' 1
As a result, the court determined that GBR had the duty to use its
best efforts to obtain a release from the lien.'3 6 The justice noted
that the record revealed no claim for breach of contract against
GBR.' 3 7 Moreover, the court maintained that GBR made substantial efforts to secure the release of the mortgage. 3 8 The supreme
court rejected Van Winkle's argument that the contract's provision
for the collateral substitution was "unreasonable and inconsistent"
with GBR's duty to Van Winkle to refrain from preventing the sale
ple of estoppel: 'One who actively prevents the occurrence of a condition cannot
rely on the nonoccurrence of that condition (to avoid liability].' " Id. (citing
George H. Beckmann, Inc. v. Rainbow's End (Zincke's), 40 N.J. Super. 193, 199200, 122 A.2d 519, 522-23 (App. Div. 1956); Kiefhaber v. Yannelli, 9 N.J. Super.
139, 142, 75 A.2d 478, 479 (App. Div. 1950); Rothman Realty Corp. v. Bereck, 73
N.J. 590, 602-03, 376 A.2d 902, 908 (1977)).
131 Id. at 347-48, 511 A.2d at 131-32.
132 Id. at 347, 511 A.2d at 131. In examining the seller's conduct and the rights
of the parties to the contract, the court stated that "there is no reason to elevate the
rights of the broker to a level higher than that of the parties to the contract of sale."
Id. See also id. at 347 n.6, 511 A.2d at 131 n.6 (citing Note, A Reexamination, supra
note 2, at 91-92 & n.61). The Van Winkle court reasoned that a broker expected to
earn a commission only ifhe was successful. Van Winkle, 103 N.J. at 347, 511 A.2d at
131 (citing Harris v. Perl, 41 N.J. 455, 462, 197 A.2d 359, 363 (1964) (emphasis
added).
133 Van Winkle, 103 N.J. at 347, 511 A.2d at 131.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 347-48, 511 A.2d at 132. The court noted that, in the contract of sale,
GBR and Columns agreed that GBR's release from the SBA lien was conditioned
"upon terms which are satisfactory to the Seller, in its sole discretion, by July 7,
1980." Id.
136 Id. at 348, 511 A.2d at 132. The supreme court found that in the contract of
sale with Columns, GBR had the duty to insert reasonable terms and to use its best
efforts to secure the release of the lien with the SBA's consent. Id. at 349, 511 A.2d
at 132.
'37 Id. at 348, 511 A.2d at 132.
The Van Winkle court found that GBR and Columns terminated the contract of sale pursuant to the contingency regarding the
SBA's release of the lien. Id. at 340-41, 511 A.2d at 128.
138 See id. at 348, 511 A.2d at 132.
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from closing.1 39 Justice Stein noted that GBR reasonably had intended to substitute the tax-exempt securities, using the proceeds of
the sale of the property.

140

The justice also dismissed the SBA's and the trial court's charge
that the loan funds were being used to purchase the proposed securities, since GBR owned the property before applying for the disaster
loan.' 4 ' Additionally, the court noted that the proposed collateral
was equal to the value of the property and was by far more liquid
than the property itself. 14 2 The court was also satisfied with the fact
that the SBA would retain exclusive approval over the purchase or
sale of securities in the portfolio.' 4 3
After considering these factors, the court found nothing to sustain an allegation of unreasonableness as to the proposal.' 4 4 Justice
Stein asserted that under the contract, GBR had the duty to propose
reasonable terms and use its best efforts to obtain the release of the
lien. 4 5 The justice opined that the SBA's rejection of the proposal
was irrelevant since the proposal itself satisfied GBR's contractual
obligation to both the buyer and Van Winkle. 14 6 The court stated
that it was almost inconceivable that GBR could violate its duty to
Van Winkle without simultaneously breaching its contractual duty to
the buyer.

14 7

Finally, the court held that in the absence of bad faith or special
circumstances, the threshold standard for imposing seller liability
139 Id. The justice advanced that Van Winkle's argument was unfounded. Id.
The court observed that GBR's proposal for the release of the lien was actually
suggested by the SBA. Id. at 348 n.8, 511 A.2d at 132 n.8. According to GBR's
attorney, the SBA had indicated during the negotiations for the loan that they
would consider releasing or substituting part of the collateral if GBR established a
good payment record. Id.
140 Id. at 348, 511 A.2d at 132.
141 Id. The court reasoned that "[slince GBR had not acquired the property with
the loan proceeds, the SBA's and the trial court's concern that the low interest loan
funds were being used to buy tax exempt securities is without foundation." Id. See
also supra note 25 and accompanying text.
142 Id. The supreme court took note of the fact that GBR viewed its proposed
collateral substitution as beneficial to the SBA, urging that they "believe[d] the
purchase price to be somewhat in excess of the worth of the real property." Id. at
340, 511 A.2d at 127-28 (quoting Letter from Samuel Bornstein, counsel for GBR,
to Ronald Langell, acting chief portfolio manager of the SBA (July 16, 1980)).
143 Id. at 348, 511 A.2d at 132. See also supra note 24 and accompanying text.
144 Van Winkle, 103 N.J. at 349, 511 A.2d at 132. The Van Winkle court determined that there was "nothing about this proposal to be unreasonable or capricious, or so lacking in good faith as to constitute a breach either of the contract or
of the seller's duty to its broker." Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
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for a brokerage commission in a failed transaction would be a determination that the seller breached the sales contract.' 4 8 The court
declared that while some contractual breaches would not result in
liability, the sales contract had to be the standard for the determination of the seller's liability.' 4 9 Justice Stein noted that in GBR's
case, the sales contract conditioned the broker's commission upon
the consummation of the transaction. 50 The court concluded that
since the seller's conduct comported with its contractual obligations, liability could not be imposed for the payment of the broker's
5
commission. ' '

The New Jersey Supreme Court was faced with the issue of defining default within the context of a complex commercial real estate
transaction. The Van Winkle court properly examined the seller's
conduct within the context of the circumstances surrounding the
transaction. The issue confronting the supreme court arose from
the intricacies of a seller's unsuccessful attempt to sell property
which was subject to a lien. As stated earlier, the Ellsworth Dobbs
decision did not address the concept of seller default.' 5 2 Thus, the
Van Winkle court assumed the task of reviewing the traditional principles governing a seller's inability to convey title. The apposite decisional law directed the court to review the seller's conduct in
relation to the seller's obligations under the contract of sale. The
well-settled precedential principles clearly indicated that the seller's
wrongful conduct which resulted in the failure to consummate the
sales transaction rendered the seller liable for the real estate broker's commission. 153

The crux of the Van Winkle decision involved the reasonableness of GBR's proposed collateral substitution which was included
in their contract of sale. The supreme court properly found that the
proposal was reasonable. The court indicated that the buyer assisted GBR in its efforts to obtain the release of the SBA lien. Furthermore, the buyer's willingness to release GBR from the contract
convinced the court that the conditions of the contract of sale were
Id.
Id., 511 A.2d at 132-33. The court indicated that "not every contractual
breach by a seller will result in liability for the commission. The seller's breach may
be innocent or unavoidable and therefore not qualitatively sufficient to justify liability for the brokerage commission." Id.
150 See id., 511 A.2d at 133.
151 Id. The court also noted that it intentionally avoided the issues of Van Winkle's breach of fiduciary duty or GBR's waiver of rights resulting from the breach.
Id. at 349 n.9, 511 A.2d at 133 n.9.
152 See supra notes 10, 99-122 and accompanying text.
153 See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
148
149
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indeed reasonable. Implied in a contract of sale conditioned upon
the occurrence of an event is the possibility that the event may not
occur. Obviously, if the parties appear to have accepted the contract as conditional, the supreme court will not invalidate the contract's terms on the grounds of unreasonableness simply because
the event fails to occur. This principle comports with the generally
1 54
accepted notion of a party's freedom of contract.
In assessing the reasonable expectations of the real estate broker and seller, it accords with common sense that the parties who
have signed the listing agreement anticipate the completion of a
sale, and not a breach.' 5 5 The supreme court's approach to determining seller liability yields to the reality of the possibility of a transaction's deterioration even where the seller in good faith has
performed all obligations under the contract of sale. Accordingly,
the terms of the contract define the seller's duties and the broker's
right to a commission. The Van Winkle decision recognized that despite the seller's good faith efforts to convey title, circumstances beyond the seller's control may prevent the sale from closing. Thus,
the court deems it necessary to protect the seller from incurring liability for a brokerage commission. In so doing, the supreme court
has preserved the initial expectations of the seller and the broker.
Arguably, the supreme court's preference for the seller in transactions that never close produces an unfavorable outcome for the
real estate broker. In limiting seller default to a wrongful conduct
determination, the court effectively denies the broker a commission
where the seller's default results from circumstances beyond the
seller's control. Ironically, the broker's right to a commission depends in large part upon circumstances beyond the broker's control,
because it is determined primarily by the conduct of the parties
brought to the contract of sale by the broker. 5 6 Ostensibly, the
broker has expended long hours and has incurred costs in rendering
a service, for which the broker anticipates compensation by way of a
154 See, e.g., Midland Carpet Corp. v. Franklin Assoc. Properties, 90 N.J. Super.
42, 46, 231 A.2d 231, 234 (App. Div. 1966) (citing Kampfv. Franklin Life Ins. Co.,
33 N.J. 36, 43, 161 A.2d 717, 720-21 (1960); Washington Construction Co. v.
Spinella, 8 N.J. 212, 217, 84 A.2d 617, 619 (1951) (New Jersey courts are reluctant
to "make a different or a better contract than the parties themselves have seen fit to
enter into.")).
155 See Van Winkle, 103 N.J. at 343, 511 A.2d at 129 (citing Ellsworth Dobbs, 50 N.J.
at 547-48, 236 A.2d at 852-53). The supreme court recognized that "[a] seller
seeks a buyer who is able to close, not merely one who is able to sign a contract ....
Id. at 343, 511 A.2d at 129.
156 See D. BURKE, supra note 5 at § 93.5.
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Thus, regardless of the broker's good faith efforts

to bring the seller and buyer together on the seller's terms, the nonfulfillment of the seller's contractual obligations render the broker
unable to recover unless the broker can prove that the seller's recalcitrance constituted fraudulent or wrongful conduct. Furthermore,
the court will bar a broker from recovery in cases involving passive
seller default except, perhaps, where the broker is able to demonstrate a seller's bad faith in dealing with the broker or a prospective
buyer.' 58 Moreover, from the broker's point of view, pursuing a recovery through litigation may prove to be the least cost-effective
method of earning a commission. Essentially Van Winkle, in conjunction with Ellsworth Dobbs, imposes on the real estate broker a
resignation to the risk of a failure in every real estate transaction.
One puzzling aspect of the Van Winkle court's decision involves
the extent to which the supreme court is willing to extend its seller
protection. In Van Winkle, the seller was engaged in a commercial
enterprise. It is recognized that the bargaining power and expertise
of commercial sellers are undoubtedly superior to that of any average home seller or buyer.' 5 9 As such, the necessity of providing ad-

ditional protection to a commercial seller is questionable, especially
absent public policy considerations such as inequality of bargaining
power or position between the seller and the broker.
In addition to enhancing the risks associated with each transaction, the Van Winkle decision may have an impact upon other aspects
of the real estate brokerage industry. As previously stated, the real
estate profession is competitive. Concomitant with the risk of an
incomplete transaction is the realization that losses must be absorbed by the broker. Inevitably, the losses will be spread among
other transactions, which in turn may intensify the aggression associated with such a competitive industry. 160 Furthermore, since the
See Note, A Reexamination, supra note 2, at 91-92 & n.61.
See id. at 91. Cf Rothman Realty Corp. v. Bereck, 73 N.J. 590, 376 A.2d 902
(1977). In Rothman Realty, the New Jersey Supreme Court denied a broker's claim
for commission against the purchasers of residential property. See id. The Rothman
157
158

Realty court justified the added protection it afforded the purchasers by distinguishing their position from that of the purchaser in Ellsworth Dobbs who "was engaged in
a commercial enterprise and [whose] position vis-a-vis the broker was quite different than that of the individual who is purchasing a residence." Id. at 602, 376 A.2d
at 908. The Rothman Realty court added: "The bargaining power and expertise of
such buyers are far superior to those of the average home purchaser. The added
protection which we afford to consumer purchasers today is not warranted or required for the type of buyer exemplified in Ellsworth Dobbs ....
Id.
159 Rothman Realty, 73 N.J. at 602, 376 A.2d at 908.
160 See R. LiFrON, supra note 3, at 88. One commentator explains the competitiveness of the brokerage profession as follows:
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broker has a substantial stake in the completion of a transaction, the
Van Winkle decision may heighten the industry's exercise of due
diligence.
Nonetheless, the supreme court should remain sensitive to the
seller's expectation in real estate transactions. This is not to say that
the court should disregard the interests of the broker. The Van Winkle decision clearly provides recourse for a broker where a seller acts
unscrupulously. In establishing the contract of sale as the focal
point for the seller's liability for the commission, the court places
the risks and burdens of the brokerage business firmly on the shoulders of the broker. A contrary response to the seller in Van Winkle
would have impinged upon the policy considerations set forth in
Ellsworth Dobbs.
The court's decision poses no new threat to the real estate brokerage profession. The nature of the profession imbues the broker
with a sense of confidence in the ability to sell real estate, so it is
realistic to assume that a broker is equally equipped with the ability
to spread the losses through subsequent transactions. By fixing the
seller's breach of contract as the focal point for imposing liability
upon the seller for the broker's commission, the court has safeguarded the potential seller's interest in selling real estate. While
the real estate broker may view the right to a commission as an allor-nothing proposition, the court justifiably retains a pragmatic approach toward all real estate transactions.
Kathleen H. Dooley
If a broker is successful he may earn substantial commissions, often disproportionately large for the time and effort spent on the particular
transaction. But, if despite all his time and efforts, he fails to make a
deal-which happens most often-he earns nothing. Obviously, it takes
an aggressive personality to survive in a business where you live by your
wits and risk your livelihood on your ability to produce a deal.

